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PER CURIAM  
Valeri Henderson is a former employee of the Internal Revenue Service.  In early 
2017, Henderson sought clarity about her disability annuity payments under the Federal 
Employees Retirement System (FERS).  With clarity came disappointment, however; the 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 





Office of Personnel Management (OPM) notified Henderson that it had adjusted her 
annuity payment downward, as of her recently celebrated 62nd birthday.     
Contending that OPM’s adjustment calculation was based on an erroneously low 
salary input, Henderson sought administrative appellate review with the Philadelphia 
Regional Office of the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB).1  A single MSPB 
administrative judge (“AJ”) dismissed Henderson’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.  The 
AJ reasoned that OPM’s annuity decision was merely preliminary; it was not “final” and 
subject to immediate review. 
Henderson then filed a pro se petition for review in this Court.  OPM was named 
as the respondent.  After Henderson filed her opening brief, we granted MSPB’s motion 
under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 15(d) to intervene.  We deferred ruling on 
MSPB’s motion insofar as it also sought reformation of the caption for this matter, 
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(2).  
Before we dispose of that motion—and before we can even reach the merits of 
Henderson’s petition—we must resolve a threshold question:  Do we have jurisdiction to 
decide this matter and, if not, who does?   
Under the applicable statutory regime, the general rule is that a petition for review 
of an adverse MSPB decision must be filed in the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit.  See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A); Kloeckner v. Solis, 568 U.S. 41, 49 (2012).  That 
 




said, there are two exceptions potentially applicable here.  First, we could review the 
petition, as a “court of competent jurisdiction” under 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B), if this 
were a case about agency reprisals in violation of the Whistleblower Protection 
Enhancement Act of 2012.  See Mount v. DHS, 937 F.3d 37, 42 (1st Cir. 2019).  Second, 
the District Court would have to review the petition, under 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2), if the 
matter involved a claim that “an agency action appealable to the MSPB violates an 
antidiscrimination statute listed in § 7702(a)(1).”  Kloeckner, 568 U.S. at 56.   
Neither exception applies.  While Henderson now argues that this case involves a 
sprawling, decades-wide collection of agency misconduct—including whistleblower 
retaliation, racial discrimination, nepotism, harassment, asbestos exposure, and improper 
handling of a fall-related workplace injury—she mentioned none of those things in her 
appeal to the MSPB.  See MSPB Resp. (doc. 47) at App’x 12–18.2  The upshot is that 
jurisdiction to review Henderson’s petition lies in the Federal Circuit, not this Court.3  As 
a result, we would be well within our authority to dismiss the petition for review. 
 
taken by a federal agency against its employees.  See 5 U.S.C. § 7701(a).  
 
2 Concurrent with pursuing this petition for review, Henderson filed with the EEOC a 
complaint against the Treasury Department claiming discrimination based on race, sex, 
disability and prior protected activity, all dating back to 1992.  The complaint was 
dismissed as untimely; on the current record, the disposition of Henderson’s related 
appeal is unclear.   
 
3 Because we do not have jurisdiction under § 7703(b)(1)(B), based on the nature of this 
action, we need not consider the application or vitality of our decision in Lancellotti v. 




We also have the authority, though, to transfer Henderson’s petition to the Federal 
Circuit.  Under the federal transfer statute, “the court shall, if it is in the interest of 
justice, transfer such action or appeal to any other such court in which the action or 
appeal could have been brought” at the outset.  28 U.S.C. § 1631.  Notably, “[s]ection 
1631 creates a presumption in favor of transfer.”  Jonson v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 877 
F.3d 52, 58 (1st Cir. 2017).   
MSPB argues that we should transfer the case to the Federal Circuit.  OPM, on the 
other hand, argues that transfer would be futile because its underlying decision is non-
final; i.e., the Federal Circuit will certainly uphold MSPB’s jurisdictional dismissal, so 
that court should be spared case-opening efforts in favor of dismissal by this Court.   
OPM may well be right that the Federal Circuit will deem Henderson’s petition for 
review meritless as a result of her premature MSPB appeal.  See, e.g., Green v. MSPB, 
766 F. App’x 995, 996 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (per curiam); cf, 5 C.F.R. § 841.308 (providing 
that “an individual whose rights or interests under FERS are affected by a final decision 
of OPM may request MSPB to review the decision”) (emphasis added).  But, especially 
in light of the presumption in favor of transfer, cf. Jonson, 877 F.3d at 58, we will leave 
that determination to the Federal Circuit; we decline to, in effect, reach the merits of a 
 
jurisdiction under § 7703 to review petitions for review filed by “former” employees 
(including FERS disability annuitants).  We thus do not consider, specifically, the merits 
of the MSPB’s argument that “Lancelotti was decided based on law that existed prior to 




petition over which we lack jurisdiction, cf. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 
486 U.S. 800, 818 (1988) (observing the “age-old rule that a court may not in any case, 
even in the interest of justice, extend its jurisdiction where none exists”).4 
III. 
For the reasons outlined above, it is hereby ORDERED that the Clerk transfer the 
petition for review to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.  See 28 
U.S.C. § 1631.  MSPB’s motion to reform the caption is denied as unnecessary in light of 
our disposition, which “terminates this proceeding in this Court.”  In re Arunachalam, 
812 F.3d 290, 294 (3d Cir. 2016). 
 
 
Federal Circuit case law; and the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over this 
appeal.”  MSPB Resp. (doc. 47) at 5. 
4 This is not a case in which the futility of transferring a petition is evident from the fact 
that the potential transferee court, like the transferor court, lacks jurisdiction.  Cf. Jonson, 
877 F.3d at 58.  For her part, Henderson laments:  “I really don’t know who has 
jurisdiction over what.”  Henderson Ltr. (doc. 46) at 2.  MSPB and OPM, meanwhile, 
agree that the Federal Circuit may exercise jurisdiction.  See OPM Resp. (doc. 42) at 5; 
MSPB Resp. (doc. 47) at 6–8, 10–12.    
